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DETERMINATION OF DISMISSAL SANCTIONS UNDER THE
SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974
INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment guarantees the right to a speedy trial.' The
Speedy Trial Act of 1974 ("STA" or the "Act")2 was introduced to en-
sure that the federal courts neither abridge nor dilute this constitutional
guarantee.3 It also was designed to reduce the recidivism rate of persons
released pretrial.4 Congress ultimately decided that the Act's purpose
could best be effectuated by setting a specific number of days within
which a defendant must be arraigned5 and brought to trial.6
A violation of the STA results in mandatory dismissal of the case or
complaint.7 The judge, however, retains the discretion to dismiss the
case with or without prejudice.' The statute specifies three factors that
1. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy... trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI.
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
3. Although the stated purpose of the STA does not expressly mention compliance
with the sixth amendment as one of its goals, the legislative history clearly demonstrates
that the Act was meant to address this concern as well. See 120 Cong. Rec. 41,774 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Conyers, ranking minority member of the House Subcommittee on
Crime); 117 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Ervin, sponsor of S. 895, an early
version of the STA); Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 669
(1976).
4. The purpose of the STA, as stated in its introduction, is "[t]o assist in reducing
crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the
supervision over persons released pending trial, and for other purposes." Speedy Trial
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2407; see 117 Cong. Rec. 3405 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 120 Cong.
Rec. 41,774 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Conyers, ranking minority member of the House
Subcommittee on Crime).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1982) provides in relevant part that "[a]ny information or
indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within
thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a sum-
mons in connection with such charges .... Id.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1982) provides in relevant part that "[i]n any case in
which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant charged in an information or
indictment with the commission of an offense shall commence within seventy days from
the filing date... of the information or indictment. . . ." Id.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982). The statute exludes certain periods of delay from the
time limit computations. Some examples of excludable periods are mental or physical
examinations of the defendant, the filing of a pretrial motion, or the absence or unavaila-
bility of an essential witness at trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The
Act also provides that any continuance that results in delay is excludable if it was granted
by the trial judge based on his findings that "the ends of justice served by taking such
action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1982). Inclusion in § 3161(h)(8) of the provision that "[n]o con-
tinuance... shall be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar, or
lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the
attorney for the Government," 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (Supp. IV 1986), further em-
phasizes the legislature's interest in curbing excessive court congestion and delays in the
prosecutor's office.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982). A dismissal with prejudice is a final adjudication of
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the court must consider in determining whether to dismiss the case with
or without prejudice: the severity of the crime; the facts and circum-
stances of the STA violation; and the impact of reprosecution on the
STA and on justice in general.9
Federal courts have interpreted these dismissal considerations in a va-
riety of ways. 'P Of the three, the second factor-facts and circumstances
of the delay-represents the most critical and the most often contested
element in a dismissal determination because it requires the trial judge to
the matter and bars a subsequent suit on the same cause of action, see Black's Law Dic-
tionary 421 (5th ed. 1979); when a case is dismissed without prejudice, the complainant
may sue again, id. An appellate court will review the trial judge's decision concerning the
type of dismissal only on an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Fountain,
Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 1988); United States v. Kramer,
827 F.2d 1174, 1179 (8th Cir. 1987). The Kramer court described the abuse of discretion
standard applied in any STA case:
An abuse of discretion occurs when a relevant factor that should have been
given significant weight is not considered, when an irrelevant or improper factor
is considered and given significant weight, or when all proper and no improper
factors are considered, but the court in weighing those factors commits a clear
error of judgment.
Id.; accord Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 4; United States v. Russo, 741
F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (1lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam). An appellate court may review the
type of STA dismissal issued by the lower court de novo if the trial court has not ad-
dressed the issue. See United States v. Tunnessen, 763 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1985) In such
a case, the appellate court does not have to remand the decision to the district court. Id.
9. The statute reads in pertinent part:
(a)(1) If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charg-
ing such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within
the time limit required.., such charge against that individual contained in such
complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among
others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts
and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a
reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of
justice.
(2) If the defendant is not brought to trial within the time limit required ...
the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defend-
ant .... In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice,
the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seri-
ousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the
dismissal; and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of this chapter
and on the administration of justice. Failure of the defendant to move for dis-
missal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall consti-
tute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982); see United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11 th Cir.
1984) (per curiam); United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385 & n.ll (9th Cir. 1987)
(government's indifference to the STA should be discouraged by dismissal with preju-
dice), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d
1265, 1268 (5th Cir.) (negligence by the government may weigh in favor of dismissal
without prejudice as long as it is not a frequently occurring event), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
463 (1986); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 244 (1st Cir. 1985) (delay due to
court's misunderstanding of a previously unlitigated provision of the Act weighs in favor
of a nonprejudicial dismissal), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986).
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determine who caused the delay and why it occurred." A controversy
currently exists over whether and to what extent prosecutorial or judicial
negligence in causing a delay warrants a dismissal of the charges or in-
dictment with prejudice.12
This Note urges that the federal courts adopt a two-step method of
analyzing STA dismissals. Under this test, courts would first determine
the weight to be accorded each individual dismissal factor and then
would weigh all three dismissal considerations together, giving more
weight to the second factor when the other two are neutral so that the
presence of prosecutorial or judicial culpability for the delay more likely
will result in dismissal with prejudice. 3 Part I of this Note explains the
background of the speedy trial right and analyzes the pertinent legislative
history of the STA. Part II looks at the interpretation and application of
each of the individual dismissal considerations and reviews those factors
considered in determining what type of dismissal each favors. Part HI
examines the controversy over the dismissal sanction considerations and
proposes a test for dismissal that weighs prosecutorial or judicial culpa-
bility for delay as a factor in favor of dismissal with prejudice. This Note
concludes that application of the two-part test that requires a dismissal
with prejudice when the first and third factors do not demand a nonprej-
udicial dismissal and the second factor indicates that no affirmative justi-
fication for the delay exists best serves the purposes of the Speedy Trial
Act.
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE STA
The interpretation of any statute begins with the language of the act
itself.14 When the language is clear, a court need not look further to de-
11. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
12. Some courts have indicated that when governmental or judicial neglect has
caused the delay, the court should dismiss with prejudice. See e.g., United States v.
Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385 n.11 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 747; United
States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267-68 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (per curiam); United States v.
Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983). Others, however, have held that a nonpreju-
dicial dismissal is appropriate where bad faith has not contributed to the delay. See. e.g.,
United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5-6 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 1988);
United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), appealfiled, 56 U.S.L.W. 3303
(U.S. Oct. 3, 1987) (No. 87-551); United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir.
1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 49 (1986); United States v.
Hawthorne, 705 F.2d 258, 260-61 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
The Supreme Court recently has granted certiorari on United States v. Taylor to deter-
mine whether a delay to trial of fourteen days beyond the statutory time limit justified the
prejudicial dismissal of a narcotics indictment. 821 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1987). cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988).
13. See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
14. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981); Lewis v. United States,
445 U.S. 55, 60 (1980); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979).
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termine the application of the statute.15 If the wording of the statute
allows for more than one reasonable construction, however, the court
may look to the legislative history to inform its interpretation. 16 The
language of the STA fails to provide any guidance on how courts should
weigh any of the dismissal considerations. 7 Furthermore, the phrasing
of these considerations has produced a good deal of dispute among the
circuits," and the language's ambiguity has caused several courts to turn
to the legislative history for guidance. 9 An examination of this history
helps to illuminate exactly how Congress intended the courts to utilize
these factors. The legislative history is more readily understood if viewed
in the context of the background and development of the speedy trial
right.
A. The Speedy Trial Right
Although the sixth amendment dates back nearly two hundred years,2"
the constitutional speedy trial right has evolved slowly,21 as the Supreme
Court has reviewed very few sixth amendment speedy trial claims. 2 The
15. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
16. See United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953); Hamilton
v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899).
17. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988). See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986); United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir.
1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 49 (1986); United States v.
Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 978-81 (2d Cir. 1983).
20. The right to a speedy trial is deeply embedded in English history. The earliest
documentation of this right issued in 1166 from an English judicial assembly called the
Assize of Clarendon. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967); S. Baxter,
Basic Documents of English History 18-20 (1968). The Magna Carta, in 1215, articu-
lated the concept that defendants have a right to a speedy trial, stating that, "[t]o no one
will we sell, to none will we deny or delay, right or justice." Id. at 27. This right was
codified in 1679 in the Habeas Corpus Act and has remained constant throughout the
course of English law. See id. at 150-51.
American jurisprudence rests on a foundation of English legal principles. See Hansen
& Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in Constitutional Perspective, 47 Miss. L.J. 365,
367-68 (1976). Many of the declarations of rights written by the newly formed states in
1776 included a speedy trial provision. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225
& n.21 (1967). This right was incorporated officially into federal law in 1789 in the Bill of
Rights in the sixth amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. VI. For a general history of the
ratification of the sixth amendment, see S. Rep. No. 87, 99th Cong., 1st. Sess. 5-11 (1985).
21. See Hansen & Reed, supra note 20, at 369; Note, The Speedy Trial Act: Conflict
Among the Circuits, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 149, 149 (1980); Note, Speedy Trial. A Constitu-
tional Right in Search of Definition, 61 Geo. L.J 657, 659 (1973) [hereinafter Constitu-
tional Right].
22. Most of the constitutional speedy trial claims that the Supreme Court has decided
have been heard in the last thirty years. See, e.g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354
(1957). As of 1976, the Supreme Court had considered the sixth amendment speedy trial
issue only twelve times. See Hansen & Reed, supra note 20, at 366 n. 11.
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elusive quality of this guarantee became apparent as early as 1905 when
the Supreme Court stated that the speedy trial right was not absolute,
and depended on the particular circumstances of the case balanced
against the public interest involved.2"
The Court first articulated the test currently used to determine
whether a sixth amendment speedy trial violation has occurred in Barker
v. Wingo.25 The Barker Court developed a four-pronged test that weighs
the facts and circumstances of the case at hand against the government's
interest in prosecution.26 The four factors enumerated in Barker are: the
length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; the extent to which the
defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial; and the resulting degree
of prejudice to the defendant's rights.' The Barker Court referred to the
length of delay as a "triggering mechanism;"2 if the delay is not suffi-
ciently long, a court need not inquire into the other factors of the test.29
The Barker analysis of speedy trial violations has engendered a good
deal of criticism.30 The test proves problematic because it provides no
specific limit to the length of delay,"1 relies on the defendant to assert the
right,32 and requires a detailed assessment of each supposed violation,
thereby exacerbating the delay and adding to court backlog.33 Both Con-
gress 4 and commentators35 have sharply criticized the Barker analysis
for placing the burden to claim a speedy trial violation on the defendant
because often it is in the defendant's best interest to remain silent and
hope that the prosecutor will find it more difficult to prove his case after
a lengthy delay.36
23. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1905).
24. See id.
25. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). The remedy for a sixth amendment speedy trial violation is
dismissal with prejudice. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 439-40 (1973). A
sixth amendment speedy trial claim and a motion for dismissal under the STA are not
mutually exclusive. See infra note 46.
26. 407 U.S. at 530.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. Length of delay is an arbitrary standard that depends on the specific cir-
cumstances of each case. Compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 830-31 (9th
Cir.) (six-month delay borderline; court will consider other factors), cert denied, 429 U.S.
854 (1976) with United States v. Otero-Hemandez, 743 F.2d 857, 858 n.3 (1 th Cir. 1984)
(seven-month delay insufficient) and United States v. Varella, 692 F.2d 1352, 1359 (11 th
Cir.) (four-month delay not presumptively prejudicial so did not trigger the Barker test),
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 838 (1983).
30. See Frase, supra note 3, at 668; Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48
Fordham L. Rev. 611, 634 (1980); Project, The Speedy TrialAct An Empirical Study, 47
Fordham L. Rev. 713, 717 & n.31 (1979).
31. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 530-31 (1972).
32. See id. at 531-32.
33. See id. at 530-32 (assessment of each of the four factors in detail).
34. See S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 120 Cong. Rec. 24,663-
64 (1974).
35. See Frase, supra note 3, at 668; Project, supra note 30, at 717.
36. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988).
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The Supreme Court launched a direct attempt to accelerate federal
criminal trials with the adoption of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
50(b) in 1972.17 Its purpose was to encourage the federal courts to
hasten their criminal trials, but, like the previously mentioned constitu-
tional protection, it largely proved ineffective because it allowed each dis-
trict to create its own plan for accelerated case disposition and to decide
whether it wanted to include a sanction provision .1
B. Legislative History of the STA
The failure of previous judicial attempts to ameliorate the problem
drew congressional attention to the need for a speedy trial act.39 Many
states had already adopted their own versions of such an act.40 Congress
focused particularly on the barriers to winning a dismissal and on the
lack of interest in accelerating the trial process on the part of judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys, many of whom had come to rely on
delay in order to deal with heavy caseloads.41 The rising crime rate in
37. Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(b).
38. See Project, supra note 30, at 719-20. The adoption of Rule 50(b) was not unani-
mous. Justice Douglas dissented from the adoption because he did not believe that the
judiciary was as well-suited to making decisions among several policy options as the legis-
lative branch. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 406 U.S. 979,
982 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
During the 1974 House hearings on the STA, Professor Daniel Freed testified to the
failure of Rule 50(b) based on a study on the Rule conducted at Yale Law School. See
Rule 50(B): Response of the District Courts (report prepared for the criminal justice
workshop at Yale Law School), reprinted in Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings on S.
754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658, H.R. 687, H.R. 773, H.R. 4807 Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 261-333
(1974) [hereinafter 1974 House Hearings]. The study found that most courts had estab-
lished time limits to arraignment and trial that closely coincided with the length of time it
had regularly taken cases to reach arraignment and trial before the rule had been adopted
and that those districts with the lengthiest time to trial were the least likely to have
sanctions included in their plans. See id. at 263-64. Rule 50(b) seemed to have no effect
on the length of time required for case disposition other than to formally certify already
dilatory procedures under the guise of speedy trial plans. Id. Rule 50(b) was amended in
1976 and the Advisory Committee Notes stated that Rule 50(b) plans gradually would be
replaced by the STA as the Act was phased into effect. Fed R. Crim. P. 50(b) Advisory
Committee Notes.
Despite evidence of the Rule's ineffectiveness, the Judicial Conference of the United
States opposed the STA in general because it believed that Rule 50(b) and individual
circuit rules were sufficient to solve the speedy trial problem. 1974 House Hearings, supra
note 38, at 176-80. The Conference's preference for the Rule may have stemmed from
the fact that the Conference originally drafted it. See id. at 176.
39. See Frase, supra note 3, at 669; Project, supra note 30, at 717-18.
40. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1382 (West 1982) (enacted 1872); Il1. Ann. Stat. Ch.
38, 103-5 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (enacted 1963); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.556 (1987) (enacted
1967); see also Constitutional Right, supra note 21, at 697-98. Congress sometimes re-
ferred to the state speedy trial acts during legislative debates. See S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 14-17, 21-22 (1974); 119 Cong. Rec. 3264 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
41. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 38, at 158; S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 15, reprinted in 120 Cong. Rec. 24,663-64 (1974).
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the 1960's,42 and the concomitant increase in the backlog in the federal
courts,43 heightened the legislature's interest in solving the speedy trial
problem.' This concern over the failure of previous judicial attempts to
cure the increasingly lengthy delays in federal criminal trials45
culminated in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.4"
While the Act itself does not specifically indicate how a judge should
choose between dismissal with or without prejudice, a look at the history
of the Act suggests an answer to this question. The Senate and House
each patterned its original bill47 after a set of speedy trial standards pub-
lished by the American Bar Association in 1968 ("ABA Standards"). 48
The ABA Standards spoke strongly in favor of dismissal with prejudice
42. See A. Partridge, Legislative History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 11
(1980).
43. See 117 Cong. Rec. 3405-06 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Ervin, sponsor of S. 895, an
early version of the STA); Project, supra note 30, at 717; Constitutional Right, supra note
21, at 657.
44. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Congress also envisioned the STA
as an alternative to a possible preventive detention bill that previously had been launched
in Congress as an answer to the problem of the many criminal defendants who enjoyed
lengthy periods of pretrial release and who were believed to be a danger to society. 115
Cong. Rec. 34,334-35 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Mikva, House sponsor of the original STA
legislation) (opposing preventive detention, believing that it was probably unconstitu-
tional, and hoping the STA would forestall further debate on it). When preventive deten-
tion legislation was introduced in Congress, even its sponsor, Senator Hruska, was not
very enthusiastic about it: he even suggested that perhaps action on the issue should be
delayed until the proposal underwent further evaluation. See 117 Cong. Rec. 15,074
(1971). Congress eventually passed a preventive detention act, see Bail Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. IV 1986), and the Supreme Court recently confirmed its
constitutionality. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. CL 2095 (1987). In an ironic twist,
the Court's decision notes the STA as one of the defendant's protections that prevents
this type of detention from being abused. See id. at 2101.
45. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). While a motion under the STA
can be brought concurrently with a sixth amendment speedy trial challenge, the STA and
the constitutional analysis operate independently. See 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1982). The
STA provides that "[n]o provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a bar to any
claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution." Id.
Fundamental differences exist between the STA and the common law Barker test. For
example, under Barker, the defendant must assert his speedy trial right and prove that
the delay prejudiced him, see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972), while under the
STA, the speedy trial time accumulates regardless of the defendant's actions and a viola-
tion mandates dismissal even if the delay has not prejudiced the defendant, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3162(a) (1982). In addition, while the Barker test allows "overcrowded courts" and
government negligence to weigh "less heavily" against dismissal, see 407 U.S. at 531, the
STA will not even permit "ends of justice" continuances to be granted when the delay is
the result of general court congestion or lack of diligent preparation by the government,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(8)(C) (1982); supra note 40.
47. See S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in Speedy Tria Hearings on S,
895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 228 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Senate Hearings]; H.R. 7107, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 Senate Hearings, supra, at 288.
48. See American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter ABA
Standards].
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for all speedy trial violations,49 stating that "the right to a speedy trial
[was] largely meaningless" if the government were allowed to rep-
rosecute a case after a violation.5" While both bills resembled the ABA
Standards in language and structure,5' the Senate bill differed in that it
mandated a dismissal with prejudice only if the defendant was not at
fault for the delay.52
Hearings held on the Senate bill in 1971," however, resulted in an
amended version, S. 754,54 which deleted the "at fault" provision from
the bill and inserted the provision that a violation would mandate a dis-
missal with prejudice.55 Although S. 754 originally barred reprosecution
after a violation,56 the bill finally passed by the Senate contained the pro-
vision that dismissal would be without prejudice until the seventh year
after enactment, after which the Act would require courts to dismiss with
prejudice, unless the government could prove "exceptional circum-
stances" for the delay.57
Senate bill 754 subsequently was introduced in the House.58 After
hearings on the bill, the House Committee on the Judiciary drafted H.R.
17409, which closely resembled S. 754 but which, in sharp contrast, im-
mediately imposed dismissal with prejudice for violations of the Act.59
49. ABA Standards, supra note 48, at § 4.1 and Commentary at 40-41.
50. Id. at 41.
51. Compare H.R. 7107, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 47, at 288 and S. 895, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971
Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 228 with ABA Standards, supra note 48, §§ 1.1-2.3,
4.1.
52. Compare S. 895, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1971 Senate Hearings,
supra note 47, at 228 with ABA Standards, supra note 48, at 4.1.
53. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 1-207.
54. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 House Hearings, supra note 38,
at 5.
55. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 House Hearings, supra note 38,
at 12-13. Then Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist (at that time in the
Office of Legal Counsel) had suggested in a letter at the 1971 Hearings that the "at fault"
provision be removed because the imprecision of the term would result in the need for
evidentiary hearings that could become burdensome to the court system. 1971 Senate
Hearings, supra note 47, at 255-56. When the STA finally was passed containing a discre-
tionary dismissal provision, the Department of Justice, however, did not object to the
district court holding evidentiary hearings to determine the nature of dismissal. Perhaps
the inclusion of dismissal without prejudice as a sanction option made them more willing
to compromise over the inclusion of the three dismissal considerations.
56. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 House Hearings, supra note 38,
at 5.
57. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 House Hearings, supra note 38,
at 13. Exceptional circumstances do not include court congestion, absence of adequate
preparation, or unavailability of witnesses. Id. The change in the dismissal sanction was
made at the request of Senators Hruska, ranking minority member of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee, and McClellan. See S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1974).
58. The bill was referred to the House on July 23, 1974. See 120 Cong. Rc. 24,657
(1974).
59. See H.R. Rep. No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 37, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 7401, 7403, 7429-30. The House Committee believed that rep-
rosecution after dismissal without prejudice, even under exceptional circumstances,
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Despite strong House support for mandatory dismissal with prejudice,"°
the final version of the bill actually passed by the House provided for a
sanction choice of either prejudicial or nonprejudicial dismissal61 and a
five year phase-in period before the sanctions would become effective.62
One Congressman stated that although the with prejudice sanction had
many supporters,
in the interest of time, because of the lateness of the calendar year...
and because of the Committee on the Judiciary's other activities, it is
felt that because the Senate is awaiting this legislation, it would be far
more prudent for all of us, regardless of our feelings... to accede to it
in the interests of enacting speedy trial legislation.6 3
Thus, the three factors that the Act required to be considered in deter-
mining the type of dismissal were added in a late amendment to the
bill," largely in response to objections from the Department of Justice65
and several Congressmen, 66 and were adopted without significant discus-
sion.67 The Senate passed the identical bill on the same day as the
House,68 and it was enacted into law on January 3, 1975.69
In 1979, just before the dismissal provisions were to become effective,
Congress amended the STA7° to delay their implementation for one more
would result in additional expenses, additional strain on the court system, and would
render the STA ineffective. Id.
60. See supra notes 51, 59 and accompanying text.
61. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076, 2079-80, reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2407, 2411-12 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3162(a) (1982)).
62. Id. at 2413. It has been suggested that the STA's five year phase-in period was
included specifically to allow the courts and prosecutors time to learn how to comply
with the Act because of the severity of the remedy of dismissal with prejudice that Con-
gress expected to be regularly applied to violations. See R. Misner, Speedy Trial Federal
and State Practice, 299-300 (1983). One version of the proposed STA explicitly noted
that a phase-in period was provided to "cushion" the impact of the mandatory dismissal
sanction. See S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974) (S. 754, the version in
question, resembled the STA except that it provided for dismissal with prejudice unless
exceptional circumstances were demonstrated).
63. 120 Cong. Rec. 41,794 (1974) (Rep. Conyers).
64. See 120 Cong. Rec. 41,778, 41,794 (1974) (remarks of Reps. Cohen, Co-chairman
of the House Subcommittee on Crime, and Wiggins).
65. See iL; see also infra note 78 (describing Justice Department concerns). One
commentator speculated that the possibility that President Ford might use a pocket veto
if the Department's concerns were not addressed may have persuaded Congress to make
the concessions. See Partridge, supra note 41, at 17.
66. The only real congressional dispute occurred over whether prejudice to the de-
fendant should be included as one of the dismissal considerations. See 120 Cong. Rec.
41,773-94 (1974).
67. See 120 Cong. Rec. 41,794-96 (1974).
68. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 House Hearings, supra note 38,
at 5.
69. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076, reprinted in 1974
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2407 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
70. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 125 Cong. Rec. 21,578,
21,611 (1979).
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year.71 The House Committee Report on the amendments to the Act
expresses a strong congressional preference for dismissal with preju-
dice:72 "While the act does permit dismissal without prejudice, extensive
use of this procedure could undermine the effectiveness of the act and
prejudice defendants, and the committee intends and expects that use of
dismissal without prejudice will be the exception and not the rule.""
Thus, while the present statute permits dismissals with or without preju-
dice,74 the history of the STA's enactment indicates strong support for
imposition of the prejudice sanction.75
Because the STA specifically provides for the availability of both sanc-
tions, no presumption exists in favor of dismissal with prejudice.76 The
legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress explicitly adopted
the three-factor test 77 as a concession to the Department of Justice,
which had objected strongly to mandatory dismissal with prejudice as
the only sanction for an STA violation.78 Although many courts have
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c) (1982). The amendment did not alter the sanction provi-
sions except for the implementation delay. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
72. The weight given to subsequent congressional pronouncements on the meaning or
intent of a statute depends on the type of legislative body making the remarks. If it is a
congressional committee, as in the present case, it is not clear how much weight it should
be given. In a similar situation, however, the Supreme Court has said that when the same
committee that had previously reported the bill on which the statute was based com-
mented on it within five years of the act's passage, "[the Committee's statement is] virtu-
ally conclusive as to the significance of that Act." Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942) (senate report five years after act's passage clarified
the status of ownership of indian reservations); see also Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S.
657, 666 & n.8, 667-68 (1980) (remarks of same committee 10 years later should not be
"rejected out of hand"); United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 33 n.9 (1980) (little signifi-
cance paid to congressional pronouncements 18 years later).
73. H.R. Rep. No. 390, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1979).
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
75. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986);
United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 243-44 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064
(1986); United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam);
United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 979-80 (2d Cir. 1983). But see United States v.
laquinta, 515 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. W. Va. 1981) (legislative history reveals that dis-
missal with prejudice is the rule and dismissal without prejudice is the exception), rev'd
on other grounds, 674 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1982).
77. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
78. The Department of Justice generally has been in the vanguard of opposition to
dismissals with prejudice. The Department made its strong opposition to prejudicial dis-
missals clear to Congress in a 1974 letter in which the Attorney General stated that
prejudicial dismissals would erode the public's confidence in the judicial system and
would endanger the welfare of all citizens. 120 Cong. Rec. 41,619-20 (1974) (letter to
Rep. Rodino, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, from Att'y Gen. William
Saxbe). Several congressmen also objected to dismissals with prejudice. See H.R. Rep.
No. 1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 80-82, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News
2456-58 (minority views of Reps. Hutchinson, McClory, Sandman, Dennis, Mayne, But-
ler, Lott, and Froehlich). They felt that Congress ought to find a more reasonable solu-
tion to the problem of speedy trial violations than dismissing complaints against possibly
guilty individuals without proper adjudication of their charges. See id. One congressman
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recognized that dismissal with prejudice gives the Act its strength, 9
some courts have argued that dismissals without prejudice may nonethe-
less remain an effective deterrent."0 Given the unlikelihood that the gov-
ernment would be disadvantaged by reprosecution, however, dismissal
without prejudice clearly offers a less compelling motivation to correct
dilatory practices."1
The courts and prosecutors share jointly the responsibility of enforce-
ment of the STA. s2 A few courts have held that when the judiciary is
solely responsible for the delay, dismissal without prejudice is appropri-
ate. 3 The sanctions, however, will not operate effectively unless judges
voiced his concerns during the final debate over the bill, but apparently he was satisfied
with the compromise that was reached over the dismissal considerations. See 120 Cong.
Rec. 41,777-78, 41,794-95 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Dennis of Indiana).
79. See e.g., United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 981 (2d Cir.
1983); United States v. Jervey, 630 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The danger that proper STA dismissal motions may be denied because of the futility of
the nonprejudicial dismissal alternative, which usually results in a retrial, has become a
reality in some jurisdictions. See United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir.
1983); United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United States v.
Cameron, 510 F. Supp. 645, 650-51 (D. Md. 1981).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 243 (Ist Cir. 1985) (grand jury
may refuse to reindict or defendant could receive a lighter sentence), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983) (reindictment
may lead to an acquittal); United States v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp. 1260, 1264-65 (D. Me.
1987) (statute of limitations may bar reprosecution).
81. Throughout the STA's legislative history, convincing arguments were made in
favor of dismissal with prejudice. Legislators and commentators have agreed from the
STA's inception that the only way to motivate individuals in the criminal justice system
to comply with the Act's provisions is for the Act to mandate a sufficiently compelling
penalty for violations. See 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 47, at 128 (prepared state-
ment of Rep. Mikva); S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974); Frase, supra note
10, at 708. The dismissal provision is meant not only to prevent delay, see 117 Cong.
Rec. 3405-06 (1971) (statement of Sen. Ervin), but also to deter ineffective use of judicial
resources. See S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974). If all members of the
judicial system worked to meet the Act's requirements, very few defendants would have
their cases dismissed. See id.
82. Sea e.g., United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 1985) (court system
"has its own independent and undelegable responsibility to enforce the Act"), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 49 (1986); United States v. Osunde, 638 F.
Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (government, as well as the court, must enforce the Act).
The language of the STA, which states that no continuance shall be given because of
general court congestion, might also give rise to the inference that the court is responsible
as well as the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see
also United States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D. Mass. 1982) ("Act explicitly
requires dismissal even when delay is attributable only to the court").
When one of the responsible parties is negligent in observing speedy trial limitations,
the other party often bears the burden of ensuring that the STA is not violated. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1180-81 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, CJ., dissenting);
United States v. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (D. Haw. 1984).
83. See Kramer, 827 F.2d at 1178; United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 533-34 &
n.9 (7th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Buxton, 630 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D. Vt. 1986)
(court glosses over judiciary's negligence and dismisses without prejudice in part because
of lack of prosecutorial culpability).
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and prosecutors are held equally accountable for delays and are forced to
choose between speedy trials and dismissals.84
The legislative history of the STA clearly indicates that Congress in-
tended the Act to eliminate dilatory practices that were causing lengthy
delays in the criminal justice system.85 It also indicates that the legisla-
ture believed that dismissal with prejudice offered the most, and possibly
only, effective means to achieve this goal.86 Although the final version of
the STA provides for dismissal with and without prejudice,87 this provi-
sion seems to be a last-minute concession to a few intransigent oppo-
nents, and not what the Act's proponents originally intended. 8 The
statutory language determines what factors the courts should consider,
89
but because the statute is vague as to how these factors should be
weighed, courts should favor a result that advances the legislature's pur-
pose-here, dismissal with prejudice best furthers the goal of reducing
trial delays.90
II. EXAMINATION OF THE DISMISSAL CONSIDERATIONS
A proper STA dismissal analysis initially requires a separate evalua-
tion of each individual factor, followed by a comparative weighing of all
three together.9 Because the statute does not state explicitly how its
three dismissal considerations are to be analyzed, 92 many courts have
developed their own tests for applying these factors.93
84. See 119 Cong. Rec. 3264 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Ervin, sponsor of S. 754). Juris-
dictions that have adopted speedy trial acts that provide only for sanctions for
prosecutorial, and not for judicial delays, see, eg., Second Circuit Rules Regarding
Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, reprinted in 8 Crim. L. Rptr. 2251-52 (1971); N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 30.30 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1988), have not been effective in
curbing court congestion, one of the greatest causes of delay. See 119 Cong. Rec. 3264
(1973) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). Although it was observed that strict application of the
STA sanctions initially might lead to a number of dismissals with prejudice, see id., if the
number became too great, a resulting public outcry would motivate prosecutors, and per-
haps some judges, to comply with the STA provisions. See id. The proponents of dismis-
sals with prejudice point out that, not only would dismissals without prejudice fail to
provide an adequate incentive to abide by the Act, see 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note
47, at 21 (testimony of Sen. Hart); Misner, supra note 62, at 300; Constitutional Right,
supra note 21, at 700, but that it also would reward "delay with further delay" by al-
lowing governmental reprosecution. See Misner, supra note 62, at 300.
85. See 117 Cong. Rec. 3405-06 (1971) (statement of Sen. Ervin); Project, supra note
30, at 717.
86. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
88. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
91. See, eg., United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 371-72 (5th Cir. 1987) (per
curiam), appealfiled, 56 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1987) (No. 87-55 1); United States v.
Phillips, 775 F.2d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241,
244-45 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986).
92. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
93. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988); see, eg., United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1987) (court's
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A. Factor One: Seriousness of the Charge
The first factor mentioned in the Act is the seriousness of the charge.'
Since the STA considerations themselves do not indicate how the sever-
ity of the crime is to be judged, 95 the courts have developed their own ad
hoc means of making this determinination,96 resulting in the lack of a
uniform method for evaluating this factor.97 In fact, rather than treating
the seriousness of the crime as an independent consideration, various
courts appear to use this factor primarily as an after-the-fact ratification
of whatever dismissal the court has already decided on after weighing the
other two factors.98 Most of these court-developed tests thus suffer from
subjectivity99 and should be discarded in favor of a more uniform, objec-
tive standard of evaluation.
Some courts borrow the Federal Parole Commission's categoriza-
tion,1"° which rates the severity of the offense on an eight-point scale.10'
Because the objectivity and simplicity of this test provides a greater de-
own STA record part of determination of impact of reprosecution on the Act); United
States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (5th Cir.) (maximum possible stat.
utory" sentence considered in determining severity of crime), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 463
(1986); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980) (length of delay part
of facts and circumstances analysis).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (8th Cir. 1987) (con-
sideration of maximum statutory sentence of crime charged); United States v. Salgado-
Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.) (use of United States Parole Commission's
severity scale), cert. denied, 107 S. CL 463 (1986); United States v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp.
1260, 1263 (D. Me. 1987) (consideration of whether crime involved violence).
97. Compare United States v. Bittle, 699 F.2d 1201, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (possession
of stolen mail considered relatively serious) and United States v. Simmons, 786 F.2d 479,
485 (2d Cir. 1986) (drug charges involving a small amount of narcotics were said to be
serious) with United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983) (mail theft not
viewed as serious) and United States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D. Mass. 1982)
(drug charges involving a small amount of narcotics considered less severe so as to re-
main a neutral factor in the dismissal determination).
98. See supra note 97.
99. See infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
100. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1987). The Parole Commission was abolished by the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1988, 2027 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (Supp. IV 1986)). This act
was amended by The Sentencing Act of 1987, which provides that the sentencing guide-
lines promulgated by the 1974 Act are applicable only to conduct that occurred after
November 1, 1987. See Sentencing Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-182, 1988 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News (101 Stat.) 1266. These guidelines, however, might provide a
reasonable alternate measure of severity. See United States Sentencing Commission, Fed-
eral Sentencing Guideline Manual (1987). The sentencing guidelines assign an offense
level, on a scale of 1 to 43, to each federal offense according to the severity of the crime.
See id. at 21-174. The use of these guidelines as a measure of severity of the crime would
provide the same predictability and uniformity in the determination of this factor that the
Parole Commission's guidelines have in the past. See infra note 101 and accompanying
text.
101. See; eg., United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267-68 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986); United States v. Osunde, 638 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D.
Cal. 1986); United States v. Smith, 588 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (D. Haw. 1984).
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gree of uniformity and predictability than other methods, it offers a more
accurate measure of the severity factor. It does not, however, solve the
problem of deciding at what point on the scale a crime becomes more
severe. A model that provides for comparative severity, however, at least
allows courts to be consistent in evaluating which crimes should be con-
sidered more serious than others.
Other courts have considered the maximum possible statutory sen-
tence for the crimes charged in determining the severity involved. 102
They determine these sentences by aggregating the maximum number of
years for each count of each crime with which the defendant is
charged. 103 This test is arbitrary and, perhaps, not very realistic because,
like the Parole Commission categorization, there exists no set number of
sentencing years above which a crime becomes "more severe." More-
over, certain criminal activities can generate a great number of charges
against a defendant which, under this aggregation test, would result in a
higher severity level than realistically may be warranted by the actual
crime committed. "
Another test used to weigh the seriousness of a crime considers
whether any violence was involved. 0 5 This test is appropriate since vio-
lence and the possible threat the defendant poses to society are relevant
to determining the seriousness of the offense.106 This test, like the others,
however, includes no quantifiable means of comparing degrees of vio-
lence with degrees of severity-a major flaw.
One last test requires that when the charges are serious, they will
weigh in favor of dismissal without prejudice unless the delay is corre-
spondingly severe.°0 This hybrid test poses problems because it involves
102. See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Peeples, 811 F.2d 849, 850 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States v. Melguizo, 824
F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), appealfiled, 56 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Oct. 3,
1987) (No. 87-551).
103. See cases cited supra note 102.
104. See, eg., Peeples, 811 F.2d at 850 (one attempt to defraud an investor resulted in
three counts of wire fraud); United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1267-68
(5th Cir.) (indictment for transporting illegal aliens; separate count for each individual
transported), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986); United States v. Simmons, 786 F.2d 479,
480, 485 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendant with small amount of heroin charged with conspiracy
to distribute, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute, each a separate count).
105. The court will consider the absence, as well as the presence, of violence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Feb. 22, 1988);
United States v. Osunde, 638 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United States v. Jones,
602 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
106. The relationship between seriousness of offense and possible danger of defendant
to society is likewise considered in determining sentences. See 4 Wharton's Criminal
Procedure § 609, at 206-07 (C. Torcia 12th ed. 1976); cf. United States v. Salerno, 107 S.
Ct. 2095, 2099 (1987) (Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires pretrial evaluation of dangerous-
ness of defendant).
107. See United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986); United States v. Simmons, 786 F.2d 479, 485 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 1454, 1456 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 533 (7th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 56
SPEEDY TRAL4L ACT
a determination of two separate considerations without providing a basis
for balancing the two factors.' 08 It also creates difficulties because it
compares length of delay-an objective factor-with seriousness of the
crime-a subjective factor."°9 A court, therefore, hypothetically could
dismiss a case without prejudice and justify its decision by finding the
crime to be sufficiently severe to outweigh any length of delay.
The STA requires courts to consider the severity of the crime in mak-
ing dismissal decisions."t 0 To use this factor meaningfully, courts must
adopt an objective, uniform standard, such as the Parole Commission
ratings, which correlates the actual seriousness of the crime to the weight
it is given in the dismissal considerations.
B. Factor Two: Circumstances Leading to Dismissal
The STA mandates that in determining the type of dismissal appropri-
ate in a particular case, the judge must look at the particular facts and
circumstances that led to the dismissal.I' Again, the Act does not state
explicitly what considerations such a determination should involve.
Therefore, many courts have developed their own set of criteria." 2 Irre-
spective of the test employed, however, the courts consistently have
sought to determine the ultimate cause of the delay."I3
Most cases discuss the length of the STA violation as part of the facts
and circumstances leading to dismissal.' " The extent of the delay goes
to the heart of the sixth amendment speedy trial right that the Act was
designed to enforce." 5 The statute, however, fails to articulate any
guidelines" 6 as to how long the delay can last before it requires a dismis-
sal with prejudice."I7 This lack of guidance gives rise to the danger that
108. Length of delay is usually considered part of the second factor, facts and circum-
stances of the case. See United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 17, 21-22 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980).
109. While The length of delay can be calculated specifically to a certain number of
days, no concrete test of severity of crime has been developed. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
111. Id.
112. See infra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 114-34 and accompanying text.
114. See cases cited supra note 108.
115. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
117. Many delays do not exceed one month and are considered to be minimally preju-
dicial to the defendant. See eg., United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir.
1987) (per curiam) (nine day delay), appealfiled, 56 U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1987)
(No. 87-551); United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385 (9th Cir. 1987) (14 day delay),
cert granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1503 (11th
Cir. 1987) (30 day delay). In one case, however, the court held a twenty-three month
delay sufficiently significant to render the facts and circumstances in favor of dismissal
with prejudice, regardless of the cause of the violation. See United States v. Stayton, 791
F.2d 17, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1986).
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courts simply may subjectively characterize the length of delay according
to the disposition they already favor after weighing the other factors." 8
Another consideration often discussed by the courts is whether the de-
fendant caused or contributed to the delay." 9 Although the STA does
not state that delays caused by the defendant are excluded from speedy
trial computations,120 many of the "excludable periods" under the Act
involve possible dilatory tactics by the defendant or his attorney.
12
Therefore, such tactics122 will not assist a defendant who purposefully
tries to delay the process in order to secure a speedy trial dismissal.
23
While the statute imposes on the defendant no obligation to ensure
that the government or court complies with the Act, 24 his silence on the
matter while the delay is mounting may weigh in favor of dismissal with-
out prejudice. 25 In some cases where the defendant has been more ac-
tively responsible for the violation than the government, courts have
dismissed without prejudice, despite a lengthy delay. 126 The conclusion
implicit in these holdings-that the defendant can either alert the prose-
cutor and the court to the running of the STA time limitations or face
reprosecution-is especially problematic. Because the statute does not
require that the defendant or his attorney 27 keep track of STA time
118. Compare United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980) (one-year
delay considered significant but not extreme) with United States v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp.
1260, 1264 (D. Me. 1987) (eight-month delay termed substantial).
119. See, eg., United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir.
Feb. 22, 1988); United States v. Miranda, No. 86-5266, slip op. at 1197 (1 1th Cir. Jan. 15,
1988); United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Car-
reon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1980). This type of analysis may derive from sixth
amendment speedy trial cases, where any delay attributable to the defendant "make[s] it
difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 532 (1972).
120. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
121. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
122. See id.; supra note 7.
123. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988) ("A defendant who waits passively while the time runs has less claim to dismis-
sal with prejudice than does a defendant who demands, but does not receive, prompt
attention.").
124. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
125. See Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5; United States v. Torbit, No.
87-5082, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1988); United States v. Miranda, No. 86-5266, slip
op. at 1197 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 1988); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Buxton, 630 F. Supp. 298, 300 (D. Vt. 1986).
126. See United States v. Peeples, 811 F.2d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1987) (per cuiam);
United States v. McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 49 (1986).
127. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Act provides for sanc-
tions against either the defense attorney or the prosecutor only if they intentionally or
knowingingly cause certain improper delays. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (1982). This sec-
tion reads in pertinent part:
(b) In any case in which counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Gov-
ernment (1) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the
fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial; (2) files a motion
solely for the purpose of delay which he knows is totally frivolous and without
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elapsed, courts should not punish the defendant for his failure to bring
the court's or prosecutor's attention to the Act.12
A third issue that some courts have considered when analyzing the
facts and circumstances of the delay is whether a particular court demon-
strates a history of speedy trial violations. 29 Where a jurisdiction fre-
quently or regularly has missed STA deadlines, governmental or judicial
oversight might not be excusable.130 This consideration is certainly ap-
propriate as prosecutorial delay is one of the problems the STA was
designed to cure. 13 1 Some courts, however, look to their own STA
records and those of the prosecution in their jurisdictions in determining
whether either of them have a regular history of STA violations.' 32 Ab-
sent such a finding, these courts are more likely to forgive a speedy trial
violation and dismiss a case without prejudice. 33 Courts must be cau-
tious not to rest their decisions solely upon this factor. Paramount con-
sideration must be given to the facts and circumstances that led to
dismissal of the particular defendant's case.' 34 Any history of STA viola-
merit; (3) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining a continuance which
he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a continuance; or
(4) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent
with section 3161 of this chapter, the court may punish any such counsel or
attorney...
(A) in the case of an appointed defense counsel, by reducing the amount of
compensation that otherwise would have been paid... in an amount not to
exceed 25 per centum thereof;
(B) in the case of a counsel retained in connection with the defense of a de-
fendant, by imposing on such counsel a fine of not to exceed 25 per centum of
the compensation to which he is entitled in connection with his defense of such
defendant;
(C) by imposing on any attorney for the Government a fine of not to exceed
$250;
(D) by denying any such counsel or attorney for the Government the right to
practice before the court considering such case for a period of not to exceed
ninety days; or
(E) by filing a report with an appropriate disciplinary committee.
Id.
128. Reliance on the defendant to alert the court or prosecutors's office to an impend-
ing speedy trial violation was one of the weaknesses of constitutional speedy trial adjudi-
cation that legislators sought to avoid when framing the STA. See supra note 34.
129. See, eg., United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), appeal filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1987) (No. 87-551); United States v. Buxton, 630 F. Supp.
298, 300 (D. Vt. 1986).
130. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988); Melguizo, 824 F.2d at 372; United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d
1265, 1268 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986).
131. See 119 Cong. Rec. 3405-06, 3264 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 117 Cong. Rec.
3405-06 (1971) (same).
132. See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Veillette, 654 F. Supp. 1260, 1264 (D. Me. 1987); United States v. Buxton, 630 F.
Supp. 298, 300 (D. Vt. 1986).
133. See Kramer, 827 F.2d at 1177; Veillette, 654 F. Supp. at 1264; Buxton, 630 F.
Supp. at 300.
134. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
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tions, therefore, should be considered as a tool for assessing the cause of
the delay, not as an end in itself.
The second factor represents the most critical 35 of the three dismissal
considerations, and courts, therefore, should be especially discriminating
about which approaches to the analysis of this factor they adopt. Cer-
tainly, length of delay is appropriate in determining how egregiously the
STA has been violated. 136 Those issues, however, that have been consid-
ered improperly, such as a court's prior history of STA violations, should
be excluded from the analysis because this factor was designed to be a
fact-specific inquiry into the roots of the delay in the case at hand.' 37
Similarly, since the statute does not place a duty on the defendant to
monitor the running of the STA, 3 ' a failure to do so should not be used
as a consideration against the defendant in weighing this factor.
C. Factor Three: Impact of Reprosecution on the Act and on the
Administration of Justice
The third factor to be considered in determining the type of dismissal
warranted after an STA violation is the impact of reprosecution on the
Act and on the administration of justice.' 9 In discussing the impact on
the STA, many opinions refer back to the second factor to determine
whether the government or court caused the delay.""4 If either of these
parties is at fault, the court must then consider whether dismissing the
case without prejudice would weaken the Act and work against what
Congress intended it to accomplish. 4'
The impact of reprosecution on the administration of justice presents a
somewhat nebulous concept, and various courts have interpreted it dif-
ferently. Some have read this factor to require an evaluation of the sever-
ity of the charge and whether a dismissal with prejudice would
undermine seriously the deterrence of crime in general.' 42 Others have
135. See infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1506 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Stayton, 791 F.2d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Veillette, 654 F.
Supp. 1260, 1264 (D. Me. 1987).
137. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982); cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1781
(1987) (case-by-case approach is required by courts when reviewing death penalty chal-
lenges; statistical evaluations of "local conditions" are more appropriately considered by
legislatures).
138. See id.; supra note 124 and accompanying text.
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986); United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980-81 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also 18 U.S.C. 3162(a) (1982).
141. See Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d at 1268 (court acknowledged in dictum that it
would be in the best interest of the Act to curb administrative neglect by dismissing with
prejudice); Caparella, 716 F.2d at 981 (violations of the Act's time limits must be viewed
as having a serious, negative impact on the administration of the STA or it will be ren-
dered largely ineffective); see also 18 U.S.C. 3162(a) (1982).
142. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988); United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1987); United States v.
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included prejudice to the defendant in considering the impact on the ad-
ministration of justice. 43
An evaluation of the impact of reprosecution on the Act generally re-
sults in a determination that a dismissal without prejudice would weaken
the STA."4 Conversely, a nonprejudicial dismissal usually is viewed as
strengthening the administration of justice.'45 A dismissal with preju-
dice, however, should not be regarded as always having a negative im-
pact on the judicial system, since protecting the constitutional rights of
defendants forms an integral part of this process.'"
Once a court has decided which type of dismissal each individual dis-
missal consideration favors, it must next compare all three factors and
determine whether together they weigh in favor of dismissal with or
without prejudice.
One court indicated that when the impact on the Act weighs in favor
of dismissal with prejudice and the impact on the administration of jus-
tice weighs in favor of a nonprejudicial dismissal, "[t]he near neutrality
of [these] factors requires a closer look at the facts and circumstances
surrounding the delay.""4 7
III. COMPARATIVE WEIGHT OF THE DISMISSAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although it is generally agreed that there is no presumption in favor of
a dismissal with prejudice,' a test may be developed that targets certain
Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 981 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Buxton, 630 F. Supp. 298,
302 (D. Vt. 1986).
143. See United States v. Torbit, No. 87-5082, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1988);
United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1178 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Rubin,
733 F.2d 837, 841 (11th Cir. 1984). Some courts have considered whether the defendant
was incarcerated during the delay when determining prejudice. See United States v.
Hawthorne, 705 F.2d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (reprosecution less likely to
prejudice defendant not in custody during the delay). But see United States v. Veillette,
654 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 (D. Me. 1987) (defendant's incarceration weighed in favor of
dismissal without prejudice because Act was better served by removing dangerous
criminals from society).
144. See eg., United States v. Salgado-Hernandez, 790 F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.),
cert denied, 107 S. CL 463 (1986); United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385-86 (9th
Cir. 1987), cerL granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976,
981 (2d Cir. 1983).
145. See eg., United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir.
Feb. 22, 1988); United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11 th Cir. 1987); Caparella,
716 F.2d at 981; United States v. Buxton, 630 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D. Vt. 1986).
146. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; cf. Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking Harm-
less Constitutional Error, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 79, 89 (1988) (procedures necessary to pro-
tect certain constitutional rights should be followed "not because [they] enhance the
accuracy of the ultimate finding of guilt or innocence, but because they foster other goals
or values").
147. United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). See
also United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing that
Russo court did not say that the two concerns always would neutralize each other, since
that would render the factor useless as part of the dismissal considerations).
148. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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factors that, when present, would routinely favor a certain type of dis-
missal. It is especially important to develop a test for weighing the sec-
ond factor of the dismissal considerations-facts and circumstances of
the case-since it is pivotal to a determination of the dismissal type. 49
This factor is particularly critical because it focuses on the very purpose
of the STA, which is to accelerate criminal trials by providing an incen-
tive for the government and the judiciary to comply with the Act's time
limitations. 150 In addition, this factor has occasioned a good deal of con-
troversy among the circuits. 151
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Russo,' 52 developed a test
that appropriately weighs the second factor. Barring a sufficient explana-
tion for the delay,153 the test considers prosecutorial or judicial culpabil-
ity for the violation as militating in favor of dismissal with prejudice. 5 4
It weighs the STA's three factors in two steps. First, it looks at the sever-
ity of the crime and the impact of reprosecution to decide if they over-
whelmingly favor dismissal without prejudice.1 55 If these factors
"militate in favor of reprosecution, mere negligence or inadvertence
[would] not automatically call for dismissal with prejudice." '56 Where
the first and third factors are neutral, however, and therefore do not
weigh heavily in favor of a nonprejudicial dismissal, 157 the court must
look at the facts and circumstances of the case to see if an affirmative
justification for the delay exists. 58 Absent such a justification, it should
dismiss the case with prejudice.159
This test accommodates any combination of factors that might arise in
an STA dismissal determination. For example, if any two factors weigh
definitively in favor of dismissal without prejudice, the court need not
give any special consideration to whether the second factor requires a
prejudicial dismissal. If only one of the factors mandates a nonprejudi-
cial dismissal, however, the second factor is determinative of the outcome
since it offers the best indication of whether the Act's intent and require-
149. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
151. See infra notes 174-89 and accompanying text.
152. 741 F.2d 1264 (1lth Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
153. See infra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 174-77, 182-84 and accompanying text. Even before it developed
the Russo test, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the importance of the Act and stated that
"the integrity of [the] legislative mandate must be guarded with zealous attention."
United States v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 841 (11th Cir. 1984).
155. See United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. In Russo, the court found a lack of affirmative justification where the
maximum excludable time had been exceeded because of miscalculations of the STA time
allowances by the government. The court found the government's explanation that it
misunderstood the application of the Act, which had recently taken effect, insufficient
because the violated provision was very clearly stated in the Act. Id.
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ments 1'6 are being met.
An affirmative justification must rise above simple negligence and must
be based on exceptional circumstances. 1 61 Russo does not define a suffi-
cient excuse beyond a simple assertion that "mere lack of improper mo-
tive is not . .. sufficient." 162 The underlying rationale of the Russo
decision appears to be that, in keeping with the spirit of the Act, unless
extenuating circumstances exist, the government's or court's culpability
for delay weighs in favor of dismissal with prejudice. 163
Acceptable justification, however, should be limited to exceptional cir-
cumstances that could not have been planned for, or even anticipated.
For example, delay caused by government or court conduct resulting
from a court's misunderstanding of a previously unlitigated provision of
the Act should constitute acceptable affirmative justification.'6 Once the
statutory language is clarified, however, no other court should be able to
exculpate itself by claiming that the provision is ambiguous.' 6 Affirma-
tive justification should not include those practices and procedures the
Act specifically was meant to cure. 166
160. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. An application of this test to United
States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988), for
example, should result in dismissal with prejudice. In Taylor, the defendant was arrested
for narcotics possession with intent to sell and held in custody for fourteen days longer
than the seventy days allowed to trial. Id. at 1378-79. The delay was caused by indiffer-
ence to the time limits of the STA by those in charge of transporting prisoners between
jurisdictions. Id. at 1385. Although narcotics charges may be considered serious and
weigh in favor of dismissal without prejudice, the second two factors favor a prejudicial
dismissal because the government is at fault for the delay and justice would be ill served
by reprosecuting a man who had already been incarcerated for eighty-four days prior to
trial. Id. at 1385-86.
161. See Russo, 741 F.2d at 1267. Although only the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly
used the Russo test, some courts have developed their own criteria for determining what
circumstances would justify governmental or prosecutorial delay and therefore allow dis-
missal without prejudice. See United States v. May, 819 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1987)
(government must offer some reason for the delay); infra note 164 and accompanying
text
162. United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
163. See id. The Russo test refers to delay caused by the government but does not
mention that occasioned by the courts. It is not clear whether this omission was in-
tended. The test should be applied to courts as well, however, since it loses half of its
strength if it addresses only half of the problem. One subsequent Eleventh Circuit court
may have interpreted the test as applicable only to the government since it dismissed a
case without prejudice where the court, but not the government, was clearly at fault. See
United States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 1454, 1456 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
164. See United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1505-06 (11th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 244-45 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986);
United States v. Tunnessen, 763 F.2d 74, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Car-
rethers, 613 F. Supp. 185, 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
165. See Brown, 770 F.2d at 245.
166. Although courts have not defined what sort of explanations for governmental or
judicial delay are acceptable, it is clear that delays caused by those very practices that
made the Act necessary in the first place are unexcusable. See, eg., United States v.
McAfee, 780 F.2d 143, 146 (1st Cir. 1985) (delay caused by administrative confusion over
court docket not acceptable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 107 S. Ct. 49
(1986); United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983) (government over-
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The test advocated here achieves a result that closely resembles what
Congress intended when it drafted the STA. 167 Two of the problems the
STA was created to eradicate, prosecutorial delay and court conges-
tion, 68 would be more effectively combatted by the Russo test's likely
response to them-dismissal with prejudice. 1 69 Even if this test did lead
to a greater number of dismissals with prejudice than currently exist," it
would be in accord with the traditional criminal law principle that it is
better to let a few guilty individuals go free than to increase the risk of
incarcerating an innocent one. 71 Although the STA does not determine
guilt or innocence,172 it is more in keeping with criminal law philosophy
to err on the side of dismissal with prejudice than unfairly to abuse a
defendant's constitutional rights by reprosecution after a speedy trial
violation. 173
Not all courts, however, agree with the Russo court's view of how the
various factors should be balanced. Disagreement centers especially on
treatment of the second factor and the weighing of judicial or
prosecutorial responsibility for delay.174 The major source of contention
seems to be whether government or court culpability should be weighed
differently if the violation was caused by purposeful delay rather than
negligent inattention to the Act. 175 Some courts have argued that when
the government or judiciary is at fault, the facts and circumstances of the
case weigh in favor of dismissal with prejudice, 76 even if the fault
sight not sufficient excuse); United States v. Jones, 602 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (E.D. Pa.
1985) (administrative neglect in transmitting court order insufficient).
167. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
170. There appears to be little danger that this test would lead to an abuse of the
discretion provided for in the statute. Subsequent Eleventh Circuit decisions have shown
that such a test will not lead invariably to a result of dismissal with prejudice. See United
States v. Miranda, No. 86-5266, slip op. at 1197-98 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 1988); United
States v. Phillips, 775 F.2d 1454, 1456 (1 lth Cir. 1985); United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d
1498, 1506-07 (11th Cir. 1987).
171. Justice Harlan's concurrence in In re Winship, where the Court reaffirmed the
principle that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in a criminal
trial, stated that "[i]n a criminal case... we do not view the social disutility of convicting
an innocent man as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty." 397
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries
1027 (Chase ed. 1878) ("[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one inno-
cent suffer.").
172. The STA is only concerned with whether the statutory time limitations have been
met, not with the merits of the underlying action. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1982).
173. Cf. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 146, at 88 (preservation of constitutional rights
outweighs the risk of erroneous fact-finding).
174. See infra notes 175-91.
175. See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1177 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385 & n.ll (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 747
(1988); United States v. Caparella, 716 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983).
176. See, e.g., Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1385-86 & n. 11; Caparella, 716 F.2d at 980; United
States v. Angelini, 553 F. Supp. 367, 370 (D. Mass. 1982).
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amounted only to negligence. 177
Other courts, however, contend that as long as the delay is not inten-
tional or designed to seek a tactical advantage, the culpability of the gov-
ernment or judiciary should not favor dismissal with prejudice.' 8 Some
of the panels in these circuits suggest that if the delay results simply from
negligent inattention to the Act's limitations, the facts and circumstances
of the case should militate in favor of dismissal without prejudice.'7 9
This argument proves problematic because very few delays are, or can be
proven to be, deliberate.' 80 Without the threat of the prejudicial dismis-
sal sanction, the offending parties have no motivation to mend their neg-
ligent practices.' 8
Courts on both sides of this issue have offered arguments as to what
effect the cause of delay should have on the weighing of this factor in the
dismissal considerations. 8 2 Adoption of a "sheer negligence" exception
would severly erode the STA because it would eliminate any incentive for
the government or court to comply with the statutory time limitations. 83
One of the effects of the STA should be to induce the government and the
177. See, eg., Taylor, 821 F.2d at 1385-86 & n.l1; Caparella, 716 F.2d at 980; Ange-
lini, 553 F. Supp. at 370. The courts that espouse this position probably would be amena-
ble to the Russo test since it too is based on the concept that mere negligence does not
necessarily justify an STA delay. See United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267 (11th
Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
178. See United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), appeal filed, 56
U.S.L.W. 3303 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1987) (No. 87-551); United States v. Hawthorne, 705 F.2d
258, 261 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 534 (7th
Cir. 1980).
179. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988); United States v. Torbit, No. 87-5082, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1988);
United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d 370, 372 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States
v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Carreon, 626 F.2d 528, 533-
34 (7th Cir. 1980).
180. In at least twelve instances, the federal courts of appeals have found the delay to
be unintentional, see United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 5 (7th
Cir. Feb. 22, 1988); United States v. Torbit, No. 87-5082, slip op. at 6 (4th Cit. Jan. 28,
1988); United States v. Miranda, No. 86-5266, slip op. at 1197 (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 1988);
United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1505 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Peeples,
811 F.2d 849, 851 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam); United States v. Salgado-Hemandez, 790
F.2d 1265, 1268 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 463 (1986); United States v. Simmons,
786 F.2d 479, 486 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 770 F.2d 241, 244 (1st Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Russo, 741 F.2d 1264, 1267
(11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); United States v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 546 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Caparella, 716
F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1983), while it appears only two have found bad faith on the part
of the governemnt, see United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1987),
cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); United States v. Hastings, No. 87-0058-F (D. Mass.
July 22, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
181. See United States v. Osunde, 638 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Cal. 1986); United
States v. Jervey, 630 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
182. See infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
183. See, eg., United States v. Taylor, 821 F.2d 1377, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1987), cert
granted, 108 S. Ct. 747 (1988); Jervey, 630 F. Supp. at 698.
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courts to change their policies and procedures to comply with the statu-
tory requirements of the Act and the sixth amendment.18 4 This can be
accomplished only if they have the incentive provided by dismissal with
prejudice.185
Two opinions suggest that a delay caused by the prosecutor's or
court's negligence should not result in a dismissal with prejudice because
such a dismissal lacks "prophylactic"' 8 6 effect because the acts that oc-
curred are not of the type likely to be repeated.' 87 Negligent violations,
however, are not necessarily incidental or unusual, but often are
chronic 88 and the result of deeply ingrained dilatory practices of both
the prosecutor's office and the court system. 89 The Russo test offers a
good solution to the problem of distinguishing between chronic delays
that need permanent redress and those delays that are caused by excep-
tional circumstances and are not likely to be repeated. 90 Because the
Russo test usually weighs prosecutorial or judicial delay in favor of dis-
missal with prejudice, it should provide motivation to amend dilatory
procedures. Because it allows dismissal without prejudice when an ex-
tenuating reason for the violation exists, 191 it does not unfairly punish
justifiable delays.
CONCLUSION
The Speedy Trial Act can function effectively only if courts take it
upon themselves to dismiss cases with prejudice when appropriate. Evi-
dence that the STA was intended primarily to curb speedy trial right
abuses caused by court congestion and certain dilatory practices and pro-
cedures of the prosecutor's office permeates the legislative history. The
history also shows that Congress recognized that neither the judiciary
nor the government would have incentive to change their procedures to
comply with the STA time limits unless the Act provided for the sanc-
tion of dismissal with prejudice.
184. See United States v. Fountain, Nos. 86-2622, 87-1465, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. Feb.
22, 1988); United States v. Okuda, No. 87-00995 (D. Hawaii Aug. 11, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file); United States v. Van Brandy, 563 F. Supp. 438, 441 (S.D. Cal.
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In addition, the Act offers the sanction of dismissal without prejudice,
primarily included in the legislation to appease the Justice Department.
This sanction is appropriate in circumstances where the severity of the
crime is great, the length of the delay is short, and reprosecution of the
defendant would not have a negative impact on the administration of
justice. Where, however, the other factors do not weigh heavily in favor
of a nonprejudicial dismissal and the government or court is at fault for
the delay, a sanction of dismissal with prejudice ought to be imposed,
regardless of whether inattention or inadvertence caused the delay.
There may, of course, be exceptional circumstances under which the
government or court's responsibility for the delay may not justify a dis-
missal with prejudice. Therefore, a test, such as the one used by the
Russo court, that allows the responsible party to demonstrate an "affirm-
ative justification" for the delay seems most consistent with the statutory
goals.
Universal implementation of the Russo test would enable the STA to
correct those problems that it was intended to address, without over-
reaching its bounds or releasing those defendants who rightly should be
reprosecuted. Moreover, uniformity among the federal courts would
provide for a more effective application of the STA, which would ensure
that all defendants have access to their sixth amendment speedy trial
right.
Martha L Wood
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